Strategic Mind: Blitzkrieg
Download File ===== https://shurll.com/2tlrpL
Strategic Mind: Blitzkrieg
Fight your way through 35 Unique WW2 battles - Aim your targets carefully, counter-attack, and strategically coordinate your Squads. The study of enemy tactics and the use of Special abilities will lead to victory!
Second Front is a tactical WWII turn-based strategy game. Craft & share your own scenarios and maps or use your strategic prowess in 48 scenarios set in iconic locations. Command over 40 types of infantry and 220 tanks, vehicles and guns. An infinite tactical sandbox experience.
What is well known by military historians today as the basic concept of blitzkrieg was analyzed by Miksche as a combination of two factors, dromological (having to do with increasing speed) and territorial (space-making):
It is the aim of strategy to win a war with as little actual fighting as possible. Hitler has followed this theory to its logical conclusion by so working on the morale of his opponents before attacking them as to make each campaign a rapid certainty from the start. Lenin put it another way when he said that "the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy." We have seen this theory most thoroughly put into practice by Hitler against his successive opponents in this war; concluding with the classic example of France, when his Fifth Column and his preparatory subversive treatment of French bureaucracy quickly nullified the will to resist of the French Army. In fact his only failure so far in a land campaign has been against the Russians, who were at great pains to eliminate their own Fifth Column in their regular purges before the war. We may justifiably hope that from this date began his certain fall. From these modern examples, it is clear that the Germans definitely direct their attacks against our morale. Is there a lesson for us in all this Is the reply to this blitzkrieg war, with its preliminary softening process another blitzkrieg on our part Or is this method merely suitable to the aggressor A brief survey of the more important strategical and technical factors in this new war should help us to find an answer.
The two new great weapons in war are the aeroplane and the tank. These, though they were both employed in the last war, did not greatly affect its strategy. This time, however, they have altered the very nature of the campaigns and consequently our strategic methods. On land they bought back that mobility and that rapid manoeuvre which was a characteristic of the Napoleonic and, most strikingly of your own Civil War, campaigns and which was lost in the static war of trench lines and masses of men in 1914-18. These two new weapons, as now employed, have restored for a period at any rate, the mastery of the offensive over the defensive on land. The Germans overcame the Low Countries and France at a mean speed of 25 miles per day, and in Russia, during the first month they averaged some 20 miles per day. This was by the use of highly trained mechanized formations supported by concentrated air power, both of which the United States and Great Britain will have in abundance before long. As your General Eisenhower is reported to have said: "When Hitler put his army on wheels, he drove right up our alley." It is up to your new army, the descendants of Jackson and Sherman, to prove him right.
Secondly, we should remember that the German army, with an air force which had already been sufficiently strong to obliterate the French air force did not attempt an invasion of England, even at a moment when we were so very weak. In other words, Hitler was not prepared to carry out the second stage of his blitzkrieg against England because he judged, and judged correctly, that the softening process of the first phase, which combined air attack and probably some Fifth Column work, had not sufficiently prepared the way. We shall refuse to be ruled by historic precedent and are determined to find new methods for the final offensive. Instead of looking for the difficulties and dangers rather should we be exhorted by the words of our General Wolfe, who, after an unsuccessful landing operation at Rochefort in 1757 said: "Nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to an undertaking of this nature which is not found to be so on trial; in war something must be allowed to chance; the greatness of an objective should be under consideration as opposed to the impediment that lie in the way; the honour of one's country is of some weight; and in particular circumstances and times the loss of a thousand men is rather an advantage than otherwise, seeing that battles save its reputation, where contrary operations sink the credit of a country, ruin its troops and cause uneasiness and discontent at home."
In a brief talk like this I have only been able to touch on a few of the bigger strategical considerations and have had to leave out many points of absorbing interest. But if they have been properly weighed up they should help us to decide on a definite united strategic policy for winning the war. Quite apart from our own particular course of action, there is the undoubted need to assist our great ally Soviet Russia. Few people have been able to estimate true military ability with accuracy, and many sound judges were happily proved to be wrong last summer.
Lastly, we should in my opinion be encouraged by the trend which modern strategy is taking under the influence of mechanized warfare. Air warfare, particularly, should play into the hands of the nation which invented the aeroplane. The proportion of effort employed both in industry and in operating these new weapons is already very great and this is a great advantage to industrial nations like ours. Both the Germans and Japanese were naturally ahead of us in the strategic employment of large air forces at the outset, and they have given us much cause for thought; new developments in warfare are more likely to take place in the aerial field than in any other, and this should be a great comfort to an air-minded nation like this.
I have therefore been a strong supporter of sanctions against Russia since 2014. Above all, the sanctions regime must, as the saying goes, combine strategic certainty with operational surprise. The Russians need to be convinced that the sanctions will not be lifted until Moscow has concluded mutually acceptable settlements with its aggrieved neighbors. In addition, the West should always have additional arrows in its sanctions quiver, both as a deterrent to further misbehavior and for use tactically to wrong-foot the Kremlin from time to time as appropriate. 59ce067264